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Are Principles Ever Properly Ignored?
A Reply to Beauchamp on Bioethical Paradigms
KAREN HANSON*
Tom Beauchamp's general conclusion seems undeniable: we may need a
variety of strategies and approaches if we are to grapple intelligently with
bioethical issues and dilemmas. His principal point about principles is also
well taken: if we think we can do without any reliance on principles and yet
engage in ethical reasoning and judgments, then we may misapprehend the
requirements of our alternative practices (for example, some versions of
casuistry), or we may neglect some important sectors of the moral field.
(Broad questions of social policy, for example, issues about resource
allocations, may not fall easily within the natural ken of virtue ethics, given
its primary focus on individual character and development.) I agree, then, with
much of what Beauchamp says about the joint employment of a number of the
current paradigms in bioethics. Principles may indeed help us sort cases, alert
us to their salient moral features. Principles may fruitfully organize our
political discussion, control and ameliorate public planning. Principles, as
much as rules, may guide conduct.
But are principles never displaced by alternative approaches? Beauchamp
welcomes the assertion of additional paradigms because he sees these
developments, once properly understood and delimited, as not only compatible
with but supportive of a paradigm of principles. Is this sense of accord well
taken? I have some worries about Beauchamp's analyses of the limitations of
the "[re-]emerging paradigms" and some doubts about the ultimate footing for
his apparently conciliatory stance. In his search for common ground and an
appropriate division of labor, Beauchamp may underestimate the competing
paradigms' distinctive claims and their interest in, and resources for, staking
those claims on ground not already surveyed and staked by principles.
Coisider first Beauchamp's characterization of and worries about casuistry.
He complains that "[c]asuists often write as if cases lead to moral ...
judgments by their facts alone. But ... this premise is dubious."' Beauchamp
then speaks of the need to interpret and evaluate cases in light of our "prior
commitments to central values."2 Beauchamp's sense that the casuists have
"overstated the promise and output power"3 of their account may in part arise
from his clear but questionable assumption that there is a sharp distinction
between facts and values. Cases are understood as describable in terms of
* Professor of Philosophy, Indiana University-Bloomington. Ph.D., 1980, Harvard University;
A.M., 1980, Harvard University; B.A., 1970, University of Minnesota.
1. Tom L. Beauchamp, Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J. 955,
964 (1994).
2. Id. at 965.
3. Id. at 964.
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"their facts alone," and it is then suggested that we must bring to bear on
those facts something from the separate realm of values: our antecedently
established moral principles or norms. But if, for example, we describe a
patient's condition as "degraded," doesn't the description blend fact and value
judgment? It is not as if there must be, first, an assertion of a neutral "fact,"
which then gets colored positively or negatively, depending on what it triggers
as it passes the independent grid of pure values. The very term that Beau-
champ here substitutes for "rule" or "principle," viz., "norm," should
particularly resonate as suggestive of the way in which what might be
(factually) described as the typical can be at the same time understood as a
standard (an evaluative standard).
Contemporary discussion of the question of whether there is a gap between
facts and values, between "is" and "ought," has focussed attention on
so-called "thick" concepts-on such ideas as courage, cowardice, treachery,
gratitude, on the lie and the promise, on the great variety of more specific
ethical notions employed in everyday life-as opposed to the thin, general
workhorses of ethical theory-the good, the obligatory. Thick concepts seem
to mark the intersection of fact and value, for they clearly involve evaluation,
and yet their correct application is also controlled by the way the world is, by
the facts. Those who, like Beauchamp, want to urge the existence of an
"is/ought" gap may insist that a thick concept should be understood as a
complex notion comprised of a descriptive element, which refers to the
specific facts in the world, and an attached but theoretically separable
prescriptive component, the all-purpose "ought," the valuation derived from
our prior personal or social commitments. Perhaps such an analysis can be
sustained, but we should note that we now need a reason to accept it, an
argument for its plausibility, some justification of it as the correct account of
thick concepts. For on the face of it, if I promised to do X, if that is the fact
of the matter, then it seems, just in virtue of that fact, that I now have a moral
reason for doing X. It does not seem I need an additional value premise-for
example, "People ought to keep their promises,"-in order to alchemize a full
description of my "promising behavior" from the inert to the morally forceful.
The American pragmatists, especially William James and, most prominently,
John Dewey, were among the earliest and the greatest critics of the Enlighten-
ment orthodoxy that fact and value are utterly disjoint; and one of Dewey's
favorite illustrative examples is drawn from the area of medical practice.
Citing our common distinctions between gross quackery and good medicine,
Dewey reminds us that "[a]ppraisals of courses of action as better and worse,
more and less serviceable, are as experimentally justified as are nonevaluative
propositions about impersonal subject matter."'4 To address the objection that
this view of valuation applies only to means, not to. ends, the intrinsic or
inherent goods in terms of which we appraise various means, Dewey offers
a sustained argument that means and ends must be understood as a continuum,
4. John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, in 13 THE LATER WORKS 191, 210-11 (Jo Ann Boydston
ed., 1988).
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and that the distinction between them is not metaphysical but only functional.
Whatever we may prize, whatever we take to be ends, whatever our "prior
commitments to central values,"
ends are appraised is the same evaluations in which things as means are
weighed. For example, an end suggests itself. But, when things are weighed
as means toward that end, it is found that it will take too much time or too
great an expenditure of energy to achieve it, or that, if it were attained, it
would bring with it certain accompanying inconveniences and the promise
of future troubles. It is then appraised and rejected as a "bad" end.'
If we think of some of the ends toward which the practice of medicine is
directed-the curing of illness, the survival of patients, etc.-we see that even
these ends, even defining aims, are, in the course of real life and concrete
cases, constantly appraised and reassessed in terms of the means required to
pursue them and the consequences that might flow from their attainment. And
is not that appraisal, an appraisal that seems to blend fact and value, both
action-guiding and the heart of our justificatory enterprise? Think again, in
contrast, of Beauchamp's illustration of how the casuist must bridge fact and
value.6 If we discover that "Person M cannot survive without person S's bone
marrow," must we, to secure moral guidance, discover or adopt the (almost
certainly false) premise "Everyone ought to help others survive through bone
marrow transplant donations"? Is it not more plausible, more to the point, to
adduce more "facts"---about Ad's condition, S's condition, their ages, other
maladies and opportunities, their relation to each other, etc.-and will not
those "facts"-without a false major premise ("Everyone ought to donate...)
but already tinged by valuation (what counts as a malady? an opportunity? a
normal life span?)-supply all the justification we can reasonably expect for
the conclusion we then draw about what S should do?
The covert assumption that there is a sharp fact/value distinction may subtly
beg part of the question raised by alternative paradigms, but Beauchamp does
offer another route to acceptance of his idea that casuistry always requires the
use of separate, antecedently given moral principles. He buttresses the claim
that casuistry must rely on prior principles by developing a comparison
between moral reasoning and the dialectical process of the law courts. But the
analogy, too, simply presupposes one of the crucial points at issue. Is there
always something akin to the law that grounds moral reasoning? If all legal
judgments must be, in the end, founded on and answerable to the law, is it
clear that all moral judgments must be, in the end, founded on and answerable
to, moral principles?
When Beauchamp tries to convey casuistry's own sense of its methods, he
says that it focusses on case interpretation and exhibits "a strong preference
for analogical reasoning over theory."7 But theory is not, of course, an
alternative mode of reasoning. What, then, is the contrast being drawn here?
5. Id. at 212.
6. Beauchamp, supra note 1, at 964-65.
7. Id. at 962.
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Is it between analogical reasoning and deduction? The deductive model would
presumably start from some moral axioms-principles, perhaps?-as major
premises. Situation descriptions would then be the minor premises. The latter
would sketch the facts, the former contain the values, and the deduced result
would be a valid moral judgment. This model, together with the sharp
fact/value distinction it might easily incorporate, seems to be endorsed by
Beauchamp in his discussion of the bone marrow case, but, when he gives
explicit attention to this question of method, Beauchamp himself denies that
deductive logic supplies the central structure of moral reasoning.'
What about that other route to theory-induction? Is this the logic that the
casuist, distinctively, does not prefer? The casuist may not avow much interest
in the generalizations that would be the products of inductive reasoning, but,
as Beauchamp notes, casuistry regards its maxims and norms as a posteriori
summaries of case experience, induced principles, and subject to modification
in the light of new experience. It is not, then, the casuist, but rather
Beauchamp, who would reject the understanding of moral principles as the
conclusions of inductive arguments. It is not the casuist, but Beauchamp, in
his repeated characterizations of principles as grounded in "preexistent
cultural understandings,"9 as "prior" to the interpretation of cases,'" who
seems to reject the power of induction to serve theory-and practice.
Still, there is something'obviously right about Beauchamp's suggestion that
casuistry exhibits some sort of antipathy to theory. And if it is true that some
casuists think they can dispense not only with the traditional theories of
philosophical ethics, but also with "theory" altogether, if they really want to
insist that their practice can do without any theory, then there is available
from contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science a criticism of
their self-understanding that I would think Beauchamp should want to employ.
If, as many epistemologists today affirm, all observation, and a fortiori all
description, is theory-laden-if there is no innocent eye or if all such an eye
would see would be, in William James's memorable phrase, a "blooming
buzzing confusion," if there is no context-independent notion of a neutral
complete description-then the practice of even the most case-bound casuist
cannot free itself from theory." Not just the terms of our descriptions, but
even the experiential character of our observation of cases-what we notice,
what we ignore, the very "feel" of our experience-will be, in part, a product
of our theoretical framework. Beauchamp indeed often hints at this sort of
8. See, for example, his remark that "particular moral rules and judgments are supported by,
though not deduced from, the principles." Id. at 956.
9. Id. at 958.
10. See, e.g., id. at 958-59.
I1. Norwood Russell Hanson first used the terminology of "theory-laden" observation. NORWOOD
R. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DIsCOvERY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION OF SCIENCE
(1958). An acknowledgment that there is no fixed and general distinction between theory and
observation need not commit one to either metaphysical idealism or subjectivism. This point is argued
by Israel Scheffler in his Science and Subjectivity. ISRAEL SCHEFFLER, SCIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY
(1967). For an overview of some of the relevant discussion of the claim that observation is theory-laden,
see THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES (Frederick Suppe ed., 2d ed. 1977).
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problem with casuistry's self-understanding, but his own assertion of a sharp
fact/value distinction might block any robust embrace of this epistemological
point as a criticism of casuistry. For the idea that all observation is theory-
laden may be structurally allied with the blurring of a sharp fact/value
distinction, and it is Beauchamp, and perhaps not the casuist, who seems to
take facts to be simply, objectively "given."
What about Beauchamp's response to the resurgence of interest in virtue
ethics? He finds salutary the virtue theorist's attention to the motives and
character of agents, but he sees this attention as enriching and, again, not
displacing a bioethical paradigm of principles. Besides, he says, virtue theory
has its limits. Maintaining that "some areas of the moral life are not readily
frameable or interpretable in the language of virtue theory,"' 2 he mentions,
as examples, judgments derived from group decision-making and action
undertaken in impersonal contexts. I agree with this worry about the
limitations of virtue theory and can imagine pressing it further. The
professional and the public official who take all their decisions to revolve
around the cultivation of their individual virtue, who see all their activities
and judgments as exercises in personal "soul-building," are just as worrisome,
if not quite as fearsome and unpredictable, as the amoralist. Power and
resources are vested by society in the professional and in the public official
on the understanding that those individuals will use those resources and that
power in the discharge of their role responsibilities. Role responsibilities,
though, are inherently impersonal. A doctor, lawyer, judge, or politician who
does not face this fact, who measures all action by its, contribution to his or
her personal character development, may well often fail to do what society
expects, what society has a right to expect, to have done.
This, then, is a reservation about the scope of virtue theory. Beauchamp's
reservations about virtue theory extend deeper than this, however. It is not
just that some stretches of the moral life-politics and institutional contexts,
say-are better sustained within a moral framework that includes principles,
rules, rights, interests, and utility. He suggests further that we may not be able
to make judgments of character, may not be able to "evaluate a motive, a
moral emotion" without some principles for evaluation, without "some basis
for the judgment that actions are obligatory, prohibited, or permissible."' 3 It
is surely true that "people of good character" can, as Beauchamp says,
perform "improper actions"-and for all the reasons he mentions: they have
"incorrect information," they make "incorrect judgments," they become
confounded, 4 or (for a reason Beauchamp does not mention) they suffer
very occasionally from weakness of the will. Yet it surely does not follow that
our judgments of action, especially our judgments of whether these actions are
"obligatory, prohibited, or permissible," form the foundation for our
judgments of motive or moral emotion. Absent some additional argument, we
12. Beauchamp, supra note 1, at 969.




should see a perfect symmetry here, on the issue of conceptual priority. A
good motive may be, as Beauchamp almost implies, a motive that leads to
good action. But it may just as reasonably be claimed that what counts as a
good action is what follows from the felicitous operation of a good motive.
Beauchamp's suggestion of a conceptual asymmetry here is one more hint
that he takes ethical principles to be the foundation of the moral life, the
unacknowledged cornerstone of each of the "[re-]emerging paradigms"; and
that hint, in turn, provides a clue to something I take to be a puzzle of his
paper. He acknowledges that, on his conception, principles do not provide "a
system of guidelines" capable of anticipating and resolving moral conflicts;
principles do not provide "mechanical solutions for moral problems."' 5 He
faults Clouser and Gert for their insistence on unified theory and universality,
and he emphasizes the need for interpretation and judgment at a stage past the
invocation of general principles. Yet he criticizes some of the other paradigms
as if from a position where, by contrast with their inadequacies, mechanical
guidelines and definitive procedures do exist. He says, for example, that
"[c]asuists have no clear methodological resource to prevent a' biased
development of cases and a neglect of relevant features of cases." 6
But compare, say, Beauchamp's principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence,
beneficence, and justice, and his account of their sources in "the common
morality" and "the traditions" of medical ethics. 7 We have here, as he says,
"norms ... based on social conventions and historical traditions"" and
centuries-old professional codes and commitments "to shield patients from
harm and provide medical care."' 9 Now think of (1) physicians' roles in the
government-sponsored Tuskegee syphilis studies,2" or (2) the recently noted
relative inattention of the medical research community to women's distinctive
health problems or to women's distinctiveness in common problems.2' In the
first case we find legions and generations of doctors, over the course of forty
years, misleading poor and sick black males about the nature of their illness
and the proffered "treatment" and then, for more than two decades after the
discovery that penicillin could cure syphilis, the deliberate withholding of that
drug from those deceived "research subjects." In the second case we find
significant disparities, along sex lines, in the allocation of public funds, with
comparatively little money dedicated to research on the diseases and
dysfunctions that tend to strike women more than men, and with much of the
15. Id. at 970.
16. Id. at 965-66.
17. Id. at 957-59.
18. Id. at 957.
19. Id. at 958.
20. For a brief account of some of the participants' attitudes and recollections, as well as the basic
details about the study, see Jim Auchmutey, Ghosts of Tuskegee, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Sept. 6, 1992,
MI. See also $37,500 Is Awarded for Each Survivor of Syphilis Project, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1975, at
35.
21. For some discussion of this issue, see Stephen Burd, Key Legislation for NIH Approaches
Enactment in Congress, 39 CHRON. HIGHER ED., June 2, 1993, at A19; Vivian W. Pinn, Women's
Health Research: Prescribing Change and Addressing the Issues, 268 JAMA 1921 (1992).
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research on common disorders, heart disease for example, conducted
exclusively on male subjects. Do we see in these cases respect for autonomy,
beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice? We may now say, "no," but if these
principles have whatever content they have as a function of "preexistant
cultural understandings,"'2 then it should not be surprising if a racist, sexist
culture found in those earlier practices no violation of its norms.23 There
may have been a "preexistent cultural understanding," but it is not clear how,
or even that, all-and here, in particular, black men and all women were
parties to that understanding. Beauchamp complains about casuistry that,
"without a stable framework of norms," it leaves "too much room for
judgment" and has "too few resources to prevent prejudiced or poorly
formulated social conventions. ' But if norms are directly rooted in social
conventions, it is unclear how they can here serve as an ameliorative resource,
and history certainly seems to show that medical traditions cannot, in fact,
prevent the operation of prejudice.
There is, after all, no way of dispensing with judgment, and no ultimate
control on judgment, in any paradigm, no way finally to "prevent prejudiced
or poorly formulated social conventions." I do not want to dismiss the power
of principles to guide and improve our thought; but we remain weak reeds,
and the marsh from which our moral reasoning and responses grow may have
no clear bottom, no fixed foundation. It sometimes seems as if Beauchamp
thinks principles can provide a foundation, a starting point or required element
for every other approach to morality. His desire to find this role for principles
is disclosed, paradoxically, in what seems a concession to the opposition, the
"alternative" or adjunct approaches. He says that "[o]ne function of principles
is to keep judgments principled without removing agent discretion."25
But what makes it clear that we must keep judgments principled? Surely we
want appropriate, sound, wise, good judgments. It remains an open question
whether these sorts of judgments must be principled.2"
22. Beauchamp, supra note 1, at 958.
23. In a discussion period at the conference where this paper was originally delivered, a member
of the audience, a physician, assured me that women's exclusion from many major health studies had
"nothing to do with ethics." The reason for women's exclusion was, he said, the simple fact that they
might become pregnant and thus ruin the study. I take that observation to be the expression of a
continuing problem with our "cultural understandings." None of us may doubt the need for controlled
studies of health matters, and we all understand the requirement that such studies equalize or hold steady
a variety of crucial variables, in order that judgments about factors that are allowed to vary can carry
some scientific weight. But so long as post-menopausal women seem overlooked and so long as a
natural capacity of most young women is regarded as a problem, so long as the physical chang-
es-pregnancy and menopause-to which the human female is naturally susceptible are regarded as
spoiling health studies, so long, that is, as the male is still seen as the human norm, "our" culture still
has a problem applying the principles of autonomy and justice to women.
24. Beauchamp, supra note 1, at 966.
25. Id. at 957 (emphasis in original).
26. In Beauchamp's published revision of his conference paper, he seems explicitly to acknowledge
this point. But the depth and force of his acknowledgment remain in question, as does the fruitfulness
of a paradigm for bioethics left virtually unexplored here or elsewhere in the conference papers.
Feminist philosophers and others have recently tried to develop an "ethics of care," an approach to
ethics that aggressively challenges not only the traditional role of principles, but also some received
ideas about the roles of universality, impartiality, and even reason in philosophical ethics. The
plausibility, serviceability, and the intended scope of a bioethics of care remain questions for another
A ,
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